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SPECIAL AGENCY.
THOUGH the principles of law applicable to cases of general
agency are well settled, and are laid down with great perspicuity
by Story, Parsons and other text writers, the distinctions between
general and special agencies, and the different rules governing
the liabilities of principals, seem to be still involved in much
uncertainty and confusion. How a special agent is to be distinguished from a general agent, becomes frequently a question of
much importance and great nicety, and there is often no certain
criterion. 'Moreover it is easier to lay down a rule, than to
determine its application in a particular instance, and there may be
great subtlety and refinement in discussing the principles, without
reaching a solution satisfactory to a candid mind in the case at bar.
A special agent is defined generally by Story, as "a person
appointed to act concerning some particular object ;" by Parsons,
as "one authorized to do one or two special things ;" by Chitty,
as "one appointed only for a particular purpose, and invested
with limited powers ;" by Kent, as "one constitutel for a particular
purpose and under a limited power ;" though all these writers
recognise these definitions as incomplete, and admit that the question whether the agent falls within them by no means always.
determines the rule of liability of the principal to third parties.
A most reasonable and proper rule, founded upon the soundestreason and clearest justice, is stated by Chitty :i his excellent work
on Contracts, though it seems to have been o-verlooked by most
of the elementary writers, "If the agent being himself engaged
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in a particular trade or business, be employed by the principal to
do certain acts for him in that trade or business, he 'ill in each
case be held to be, with reference to his employment, a general
agent, and the public having no means of knowing what are in any
particular case within the general scope of the agent's powers-the
wishes and directions of the principal,-the latter will be liable
even though his orders be violated. In such a case the principal
having for his own convenience induced the public to consider that
his agent was possessed of general powers, is bound by the exercise,
on the agent's part, of the authority which he thus allowed him to
assume :" p. 284. This principle, so wise and salutary as to commend itself at once to every clear-thinking mind, is supplemented
on p. 289 by the further rule: "Factors and brokers are both, it
would appear, general agents, and hence it follows that-except
in cases where it is known to be usual to limit their authority,
although the actual limit be not known-all contracts made by
them in the ordinary course of their employment, without notice by
third parties of their private instructions, and without fraud or
collusion, are binding on their principals."
These rules as thus laid down contain all the restrictions necessary
to the safe conduct of business, and the protection of principals
so far as they should be protected as against innocent third parties ; for in cases of agency the universally recognised principle
is to be. applied that he who, even without intentional fraud,
has enabled any person to do an act which must be irtjurious
to himself, or to another innocent party, shall himself suffer the
injury, rather than the innocent party Who has placed confidence
in him. The principal who has appointed the agent, has clothed
him with the indicia of agency and authority, and has thus in
the furtherance of his own business, given him the power and
position to do injury, should be the one to suffer for any abuses
or misapplication of that power or authority. And the reason
and justice of this is precisely the same in cases of general and
of special agency. The principal of course should not be bound
by any act of the special agent beyond what it was reasonable and
proper or usual for the agent to do in the course of his agency.
If the owner sends another with a horse for sale, it,is well estab-.
lished that he has the implied power to warrant his soundness;
that is reasonable and proper. He may also sell him for a fair
price. But if the agent were to offer a ftluable horse for twenty-
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five dollars, the purchaser should he at once put upon inquify as
to his agency, and whether he had the right to sell him at such a
sacrifice; or if he warrants him to trot in 2.30, the principal would
not be bound, unless lie had given proper authority for such a
warranty, as that would be an extraordinary warranty, and the
purchaser should be at once put upon inquiry.
In both cases of general and special agency, the authority of the
agent, whether conferred in writing or by parol, includes all the
necesN-ary ard usual means of executing it with effect: Story on
Agency, § 58 ; 1 Parsons on Contracts 57 ; Paley on Agency 189;
2 Kent 618; 1 Chitty on Contracts, note to page 286.
If then the agent be prohibited by his principal from using
certain of these means, -which would ordinarily be necessary and
usual, what will be the effect upon third parties dealing with the
agent in ignorance of this prohibition? In the case of a general
agent the principal would certainly be bound, and in the case of a
special agent, although this precise point is by no means settled
in the books, it would seem that he should also be bound; otherwice innocent third parties would only know the existence of the
limitation after the injury had been done. When too late they
would discover that the liability of the professedly contracting
party was but a myth and a hallucination. Suppose for example,
that a merchant should intrust a note to a broker for negotiation,
with the direction "not to go to a National Bank with it," but the
broker should sell it to a National Bank, who hold it till maturity.
If the merchant has received the proceeds, he would of course be
liable on that ground, but if the broker had converted them, could
the merchant successfully defend against the note in the hands of
the bank on the ground of his prohibition ? It would certainly
seem that in reason and justice, and by analogy, he could not,
whether the broker be considered as a general or a special agent;
otherwise there can be no safety in dealing with an agent.
In Anderson v. Coonley, 21 Wendell 280, it is distinctly stated,
"The authority of the agent being limited to a particular business
does not make it special; it may be general in regard to that, as
if the range of it was unlimited."
Nor can the distinction between a general and special agency
be established by inquiring whether this was the first time that the
'agent had acted as such, for an agency is established either by the
authority actually conferred upon the agent, or by the manner in
which he is held out to the world as possessing authority, and
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either of these may be the same ini a first as in a subsequent employment or act. If a man appoints another to do all his business
in a particular line, he becomes forthwith general agent within
that line, and his first act in that capacity binds his principal precisely as though he had acted during a term of years.
In Barberv. Briftan Hall, 26 Vermont 112, which was a case
of first employment, BENNETT, J., in delivering the opinion of
the court, states the case and the law briefly and clearly: "The
defendants sent their own agent for the plaintiff (a physician), and
clothed him with authority to employ plaintiff to visit the boy, and
though the agent was told to inform the plaintiff that the defendants would pay him for the first visit, yet this the agent for some
cause neglected to do, and employed the plaintiff generally to
attend the boy so long as he might need medical aid. The law is
well settled that if an injury is to result to one man from the omissions or neglect of an agent of another, the principal must be held
liable. In this cause the defendants, through the neglect of their
agent, caused the services to be rendered upon their credit, and the
case is within the above principle." And Judge Story tells us
in § 131 of his work on Agency, it makes no difference in the case
of a factor who from the nature of his business possesses a general authority to sell, whether he has been ordinarily employed
by the principal to sell or whether it is the first and only instance
of his being so employed by the principal; for still being a known
factor, he is held out by the principal as possessing in effect all the
ordinary general authority of a factor in relation to the particular
sale. And again, § 133, "1So far as the agent, whether he is a
general or special agent, is in any case held out to the public at
large, or to third persons dealing with him, as competent to contract for and to bind the principal, the latter will be bound by the
acts of the agent, notwithstanding he may have deviated from his
secret instructions and orders; for otherwise, such secret instructions and orders would operate as a fraud upon the unsuspecting
confidence and conduct of the other party." And these rules
thus stated by Mr. Justice Story, are approved by the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts in Soldell v. Baker, 1 Metcalf 202, 203.
And even in case of an agent constituted for a special purpose,
the rule is laid down by Kent, 2 Com. 621, that though the person
dealing with him does so at his peril, when the agent passes the
precise limits of his power, yet if he pursues the power as exhibited to the public, his principal is bound, even if private in-
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structions had still further limited the special power. In the case
of Hateh v. Taylor, 10 New Hampshire 538, PARKER, C. J., in
delivering the opinion of the court, elaborately discusses the doctrine
of special agency, and lays down the distinctions between authority and instructions, more satisfactorily and clearly than we
have elsewhere found them. le says: " It is contended, however,
that the distinction between authority and instructions does not
apply in cases of special agents," &c. "But it is, we think, apparent
enough that all which may be said to a special agent, about the mode
in which his agency is to be executed, even if said at the time that
the authority is conferred, or the agency constituted, cannot be
regarded as part of the authority itself, or as a qualification or
limitation upon it. There may be at times upon the constitution
of a special agency, and there often is, not only an authority
given to the agent, in virtue of which he is to do the act proposed,
but also certain communications addressed to the private ear of
the agent, although they relate to the manner in which the
authority is to be executed, and are intended as a guide to direct
its execution. These communications may, to a certain extent,
be intended to limit the action of the agent; that is, the principal
intends and expects that they shall be regarded and adhered to in
the execution of the agency; and should the agent depart from
them, he would violate the instructions given him by the principal, at the time when he was constituted agent, and executed the
act he was intended to perform in a case in which the principal
did not expect that it should be done. And yet in such case he
may have acted entirely within the scope of the authority given
him and the principal be bound by his acts. This could not be
so if those communications were limitations upon the authority
of the agent. It is only because they are not to be regarded as
part of the authority given, or a limitation upon that authority,
that the act of the agent is valid, although done in violation of
them ; and the matter depends upon the character of the communications thus made by the principal and disregarded by the agent."
Another principle is sometimes applicable even in cases of special
agency, that a recognition by the principal of the agency in the
particular instances is evidence of the authority; as where a person
subscribes policies in another's name, and upon a loss happening
the latter pays the amount. This would be evidence of a general
authority to subscribe policies: 2 Starkie on Evidence 43.
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This would seem to operate in the nature of an estoppel, and
the principal cannot be permitted to be at the same time recognising
and denying the agency.
In a case recently tried at nisi prius, where a real estate agent
had been employed to negotiate a loan, but the principal claimed
't]at there was a specific limitation to his authority, it was strenuously contended on his behalf, that the burden of proof was
upon the plaintiff to establish the agency, in all its terms; and that
unless he could show by a preponderance of testimony that there
was no such limitation as claimed by the defendant, he must fail
in his case. This however cannot be the law: first, because under
the well established rules of evidence, whenever certain facts are
peculiarly within the knowledge of one party, upon him lies the
burden of proof as to these facts: Taylor's Law of Evidence, § 847,
p. 384; 1 Phillips on Evidence 821. Secondly, because such limitation is matter of defence and avoidance, set up by the defendant, the plaintiff having in the first instance made out a primd
facie case. In constituting an agency, the principal and agent
are ordinarily the only persons cognisant of the facts, and of any
special terms, conditions or limitations of that agency, while persons dealing with such agent have usually no means whatever of
knowing, anything of the particulars of the constitution of the
agency. If then the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, he
must necessarily in every case where the principal and agent,
either honestly or dishonestly, differ in their testimony as to the
special conditions or limitations of the agency, fail in an action
against either the principal or agent, and however meritorious his
cause of action may be, remain thus utterly and absolutely without remedy. With such a burden upon him he could of course
never recover from either principal or agent. Such a result is
not in accordance with nor contemplated by the law of agency.
The innocent party must have his remedy, while the principal
and agent must settle between themselves. The plaintiff must of
course establish the agency by a clear preponderance of proof;
but hav'ing once done that, and the agent having been, so far
as the person dealing with him could know, competent to act
and bind the principal, 'the burden is and ought to be upon the
defendant to establish any condition or limitation. It will not do.
to say that where the agent has the indicia of full authority,
though in fact it has been limited, a person dealing with the agent
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has the presumption of authority in the agent, but that such presunption is repelled as soon as the principal testifies that the
authority was never actually conferred, even though there be
couterbalancitg testinony to establish the authority. Though
UnIquestionally the plaintiff has the burden in establishing the

agen y, the condition or limitation is matter of defence, and as to
that the (h-fendat settimg it up has the affirmative of the issue
and in this particular must bear the onus probandi.
If the evidence as to the condition or limitation is evenly
balanced, that defence must fail. Of what possible value is a presumuption, if one cannot act upon it, and if it confers no sort of
protection upon one who in good faith has acted upon it? No
doctrine of agency could be more fruitful of deception and imposition than this.
In cases clearly of special agency, the rule is certainly established by the regular current of authorities, that the principal is
only bound by the acts of the agent within the limits and scope of
the authority conferred upon him; but the distinctions between
limitations to his authority and private directions or instructions
as to the manner of executing that authority, are vague and
shadowy, and unsatisfactory in the extreme. Limitations enter
into and become of the essence of the authority ; whereas directions
or instructions are merely guides to the agent, and cannot affect
third parties acting in good faith and in ignorance of them.
In eases of general agency the universal tendency of the courts,
both in England and in this country, has been to protect innocent
third parties in preference to the principal, while in cases of special
agency, they determine the liability by the terms of the authority,
but in deciding the question whether the agency in a given case
is general or special, some have looked at the transaction between
the principal and agent. when the agency was in fact originallr
constituted, while others have, with what seems to me to be the
better reason, considered rather the relations to those dealing with
the acgemmt and with whom the agent was expected to deal, and have
inquired whether the agent was held out to the world as possessing
general authority, and whether third parties dealing in good faith
with him were justified in believing that he was a general agent,
or possessed of general powers in the particular business. The
reason of the rules established for the protection of persons dealing
in good faith with an agent, apply with equal force to cases of
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general and special agency, provided only that in the latter case
they had good reason to believe that the agent was in fact possessed
of the powers which he claimed the right to exercise; and the
principal, who has clothed even a special agent with every appearance of lawful authority, and allowed the world to believe that a
certain authority existed, must have some liability in the matter.
Special agency cannot be all advantage to the principal and no
liability. There is no such an anomaly in this branch ofjurisprudence. Such a rule of law, or such an application of existing rules,
would be in the highest degree unjust. It would be simply preying
upon innocent men, and a special agent would be nothing more nor
less than a man sent out, with a roving commission, to perpetrate
continuous frauds upon the community.
It is also now well established, that a special agent, even acting
without authority, may in certain cases bind his principal. This
is true in case of a bank teller who certifies checks when the drawer
has in fact no funds on deposit. This principle has been twice
decided by the New York Court of Appeals, and each time elaborately argued and discussed. In the first case, Farners' &
Mechanics' Bank of Kent Co. v. Butchers' and Drovers' Bank,
14 New York 627, the court say that although the plaintiff was
chargeable with knowledge that the power of the teller to certify
checks was confined to such as should be drawn by parties having
money on deposit, the teller having been appointed by the bank to
create evidence on their behalf of that fact, and authorized to hold
out to parties inquiring for the existence of such funds, the bank
should be held liable. In the same case as reported in 16 New
York, Judge SAMUEL L. SELDEN, in delivering the opinion of the
court, and treating the case as one of an agency specially restricted,
said, p. 133, that the principle assumed by the defence, that
principals are bound only by the authorized acts of their agents,
except where the agent has been apparently clothed with an
authority beyond that actually conferred, is too broad to be
sustairnej; that principals have repeatedly been held responsible
for the false representations of their agents, not on the ground
that the agents had any authority, either real or apparent, to
make such representations, but for reasons entirely different;
citing with approval Lord HoLT's remark in Hem v. Nichols, 1
Salkeld 289: "Seeing somebody must be a loser by this deceit, it
is more reasonable that he who employs and puts a confidence in

